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美智库:中巴同盟的局 限

Abstract: After the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan in May 2011, Pakistani politicalleaders played up their country’s relations with China,touting Beijing as an alternative partner to Washington. But China’s concerns over Pakistan’sfuture stability will likely limit the extent to which it will help Pakistan out ofits economic difficulties. While Chinahas an interest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan, the economic relationship is not veryextensive and the notion that Chinese ties could serve as a replacement for U.S. ties isfar-fetched. Instead of wringing hands over Chinese influence on Pakistan, the U.S.should seek cooperation from Beijing inencouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan—which will benefit allparties involved.
摘要:2011年5月美国袭击了奥萨马·本拉登在巴基斯坦的藏身之处后,巴基斯坦的领导人开始鼓吹他们与 中国的关系,大有用北京取代华盛顿之势。不过中国为巴基斯坦未来的稳定感 到担忧,这可能会影响到北京帮助巴基斯 坦走出经济窘境的力度。中国热衷于与巴 基斯坦保持紧密的防卫关系,两者之间的经济联系则不温不火,而用中国来取代美国的作用也只是一厢情愿罢了。 美国应该在支持一个更加稳定和繁荣的 巴基斯坦方面寻求与北京的合作,而不是排挤中国在巴基斯 坦的影响——这 对各方都有裨益。

In the wake of the U.S. raid on Osama binLaden’s compound last May and deteriorating relations between Islamabad andWashington, Pakistani leaders have sought to play up their country’s relationswith China, touting Beijing as an alternative partner to Washington. However, China’s concerns about the future stability anddevelopment of Pakistan willlimit the extent to which Chinawill bail Pakistan out ofits current economic difficulties, and the degree to which China will seek to drive a wedge between Islamabad and Washington.
去年5月美国袭击了本拉登的藏身之地,伊斯兰堡和华 盛顿关系恶化,紧接着巴 基斯坦领导人热 捧巴中关系,鼓吹华盛顿 可以被北京取而代之。然而 中国对巴基斯坦未来的稳定和发展的担忧,不仅会影响到中国帮助巴基斯坦走出目前的经济窘境的力度,也会对中国寻求破坏伊斯兰堡和华盛顿 之间的关系造 成影响。

Chinese security interests in Pakistan are driven primarily by China’s desire to contain India. Beijinghas built up Pakistan’sconventional military as well as nuclear and missile capabilities over theyears to help keep India offbalance and focused on threats emanating from Pakistan. China’s concrete economic and politicalinterests in Pakistanitself are not that extensive. China’seconomic commitment to Pakistan,for instance, is not especially impressive in size and has shown clear limits. China has shown little interest in propping up Pakistan’seconomy and has not provided substantial economic aid, even during times ofneed.
中国在巴基斯坦的安全利益主要是因为中国渴望牵制印度。近些年来,北京通过增强巴基斯坦的常规军事以及核、导弹 的能力来保持对印 度的压制,使其把精力 集中在应对来自巴基 斯坦的威胁。 中国在 巴基斯坦实际的经济和政治利益则要寡淡的多。比如中国对巴基斯坦经济许诺的规模并不那么令人印象 深刻,这 个局限已经是老生常谈了。中国在支持巴基 斯坦经济方面兴趣索然,即便是在最需要的时刻也没有提供实质性的经济援助。

In the past, U.S.officials have worried that pushing Pakistantoo hard to crack down on terrorists could drive Islamabadmore firmly into Beijing’sembrace. But China’s lukewarm response to Pakistan’s recent overturesdemonstrates that there are limits to what Islamabad can expect from its“all-weather friend”—a term often used by Pakistani officials when referring toChina. While China has aninterest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan,the notion that Chinese ties could serve as a replacement for U.S. ties hasbeen overstated by Pakistani officials. The U.S. has provided considerablyhigher amounts of economic and military aid to Pakistan over the past decadeand also serves as a link to the rest of the Western nations, which otherwisewould likely be inclined to sanction Pakistan for its nuclear and terrorismactivities.
过去,美国政府担心在镇压恐怖分子方面对巴基斯坦的打压太甚 可能 会使 伊斯兰堡坚定地倒向北京的怀抱。但是中国对巴基斯坦最近的提议反应冷谈,这表明了巴基斯 坦期望从中国这个官方提及时言必称‘全天候的朋友’身上得到的也是 有 限制的。中国热衷于与巴基斯坦保持 紧密的防卫关系,两者之间的经济联系则不温不火, 而用中国来取代美国的作用也只是一厢情愿罢了。在过去的几十年中,美国已经向巴基 斯坦提供了相当多的经济和军事援助,同时充当着连接 其他西方国家的纽带,否 则它们会因为巴基斯坦的核武器与恐怖主义活动而加以制裁。

U.S. policymakers must recognize these limits to the benefits that Pakistan will receive from China. Chinais increasingly concerned about Islamist extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, and there may be room for Washington to seek Beijing’scooperation in encouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan. The U.S. should make clear to China that adopting a more holistic approach toterrorism issues in Pakistanwould help mitigate threats to both Washingtonand Beijing, since Islamabad’s support for some terrorist groupsstrengthens the ideological base, logistical capabilities, and financialsupport for all Islamist terrorist groups.
美国的 决策者必须意识到巴基斯坦从中国获得的利益是有限制的。中国日益担 心 巴基斯坦境内的伊斯兰极端主义和恐怖主义,这使得华 盛顿有余地在支持一个更加稳定和繁荣的巴基斯坦方面寻求与北京的合作。美国 应该明确地告诉中国,在巴 基斯坦的恐怖主义问题上采取通盘考量有助于缓解华盛顿和北京(面临)的威胁,因为伊斯兰堡支 持的一 些恐怖组织为所有 伊斯兰恐 怖组织加强了意识形态基础、后勤能 力以及财 政支持。

Long-Standing Security Ties
由来已久的 防卫关 系


Pakistan and Chinahave long-standing strategic ties, dating back five decades. China maintains a robust defense relationshipwith Pakistan and views astrong partnership with Pakistanas a useful way to contain Indian power in the region and divert Indianmilitary force and strategic attention away from China. The China–Pakistanpartnership serves both Chinese and Pakistani interests by presenting India with apotential two-front theater in the event of war with either country. Chineseofficials also view a certain degree of India–Pakistan tension as advancingtheir own strategic interests, as such friction bogs Indiadown in South Asia and interferes with New Delhi’sability to assert its global ambitions and compete with China at theinternational level.
巴基斯坦和中国的 战略伙伴关系可以追溯到50年前。中国同巴基斯坦保持着密切的 防御联系,并认为与 巴基斯坦良好的合作关系可以在这一地区有效地牵制印度,把印度的军 事力量和战略注意力从中国身上移开。中巴的伙伴关系是双方利益均沾,无论印度和其中哪个国家 开战, 都将面临腹背受敌的威胁。中国政府同时认为印 巴 之间某种程度的紧张关系增强了他们自身的战略利益,除此之外,印度在南亚泥潭中遇到的阻 力,以及新德 里坚持 其全球野心 和在国际层面上同中国竞争受到的干扰也随之增加。

China is Pakistan’slargest defense supplier. The Chinese JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft iscurrently under serial production at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, and aninitial batch of 250 to 300 planes is scheduled. Chinaalso plans to provide Pakistanwith J-10 medium-role combat aircraft, with an initial delivery of 30 to 35planes.[1] Other recent sales of conventional weapons include F-22P frigateswith helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, T-85 tanks, F-7 aircraft, small arms, andammunition. China alsohelped Pakistanbuild its Heavy Mechanical Complex, Aeronautical Complex, and several defenseproduction units. While the U.S.has sanctioned Pakistan inthe past—in 1965 and again in 1990—Chinahas consistently supported Pakistan’smilitary modernization.
中国是巴基斯坦最大的军火供应商。中国的枭龙战机在巴基斯坦航空  综合中心开始量产,预计首批生产250到300架飞机。同时中国计划向巴基斯坦提供歼10战斗机,首批交付30到35架。最近销售的常规武器还包括携 带直升机的F22P导弹护卫舰,K8喷气式教练机,T85坦克,歼7战斗机,轻武器和弹药。中国还帮巴基斯坦建 立了重型机械厂、航空综合中心 以及一些国防生产单位。美国在1965年和1990年两次 对巴基斯坦进行制裁的时候,中国始终坚定地支持巴基斯坦的军事现代化。

There are signs that Pakistan–China defensecooperation received a boost following the United States’ May 2 raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan.Two weeks after the raid, Pakistan’sprime minister, Yousuf Raza Gilani, traveled to Beijingin an attempt to showcase the China–Pakistan relationship as the pillar of Pakistan’sforeign policy. The U.S.decision to pursue the bin Laden raid unilaterally without prior notificationof Pakistani officials incensed the Pakistani military leadership.
种种迹象表明,5月2日美国对本 拉登在巴境内阿伯塔 巴德的藏匿处发动的袭击进一步推动了巴中 的防御合作。在袭击 的两个星期之后,巴总理优素福·拉扎·吉拉尼出访北京,着力把中巴关系作为巴 基斯坦外交政策的定海 神针展示给外界。美国在没有事先通知 巴基斯坦 官方的 情况下继续 追 捕本拉登的行为激 怒了巴基 斯坦的军方领导人。

To demonstrate its displeasure over theoperation, Pakistan kickedout 90 U.S.military trainers from the country and turned its attention to its“all-weather” friend. In response to Pakistan’s overtures, China called on theU.S. to respect the “independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity” ofPakistan and announced it would expedite the delivery of 50 JF-17 aircraftequipped with upgraded avionics to Pakistan.[2] However, when Pakistan’sdefense minister claimed that Pakistan had invited China to start building anaval base at Gwadar Port, Chinese officials publicly dismissed the notion.Despite Pakistani assurances that they did not provide Chinese officials withaccess to wreckage from the stealth helicopter used by U.S. Special Forces inthe bin Laden raid, U.S.intelligence officials reportedly believe the Pakistanis did allow Chineseengineers to inspect the helicopter parts before they were returned to the U.S.[3]
为了表达对此次行为的不 满,巴基斯坦把90美军教官遣散回国,转而把 注意力放到了那个‘全天候’的朋友身上。作为对巴方提议的回应,中国要求美国尊重巴基斯坦的‘独立、主权和领土完整’,并宣布将加快把50架升级过航电设备的枭龙战 机交付给巴方。然而当巴国防部 长宣布巴 基斯坦将邀请中 国在瓜达尔港建立海军基地的时 候,中国官方公开否认了这一设想。尽管巴基斯坦保 证他们没 有授权让中国政府接近美国在 袭击本 拉登时所使用的隐形 直升机的残骸,据传美国的情 报人员相信巴基斯坦在把飞机归 还美方之前的确 让中国专家勘验了飞机 残骸。

Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Cooperation.It is widely acknowledged that Chinatransferred equipment and technology and provided scientific expertise to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missileprograms throughout the 1980s and 1990s, enhancing Pakistan’s strength in the SouthAsian strategic balance. The most significant development in Chinese–Pakistanimilitary cooperation occurred in 1992, when Chinasupplied Pakistanwith 34 short-range ballistic M-11 missiles. Beijingalso built a turn-key ballistic missile manufacturing facility near Rawalpindi, and helped Pakistan develop the 750-km-rangesolid-fueled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile.
核武器 和弹道导弹的合作。众所周知,上世纪80到90年代, 中国向巴基斯坦的核武器和弹道导弹项目转移 了设备和技 术并提供技术人员,增强了巴基斯坦在南亚的战略平衡。1992年是中巴军事合作的里程碑,中国 向巴基 斯坦提供了34枚东风-11短程弹道导弹。北京 还在拉瓦尔品第(巴基斯坦东北部)附近建立了成套的弹道导弹生产基地, 帮助巴基斯坦研发了 射程为750公里 的固体燃 料推进的沙欣1号弹道导弹。

In a recently released letter from 2003,Abdul Qadeer (A. Q.) Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who was instrumentalin developing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and who confessed in 2004 torunning a nuclear black market from Pakistan, suggests that China had suppliedPakistan with significant quantities of low-enriched uranium, allowing Pakistanto accelerate the production of weapons-grade uranium in the early 1980s.[4]There are also indications that China provided Pakistan with nuclear warheaddesigns from China’s 1966 nuclear test.[5] In 1994, information surfaced thatChina’s Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation had transferred 5,000 ring magnetsto a Pakistani nuclear weapons lab for use in gas centrifuges to enrichuranium.[6] The harsh international reaction to the transfer prompted China topledge in 1996 that it would not allow any further cooperation withunsafeguarded nuclear facilities.[7]
据最近公开的一份2003年的文件称,2004年,主持研发了巴基斯 坦核 武器项目的巴核科学家阿卜杜勒·卡迪尔·汗坦 承自己在巴基斯坦运作着一个地下核市场,并暗示中国在上世纪80年代早期向巴基斯坦提供了低浓缩铀的关键技术,允许巴基斯坦加速 生产出武器级浓缩铀。有证据表 明中国向巴基斯坦提供了1966年中 国核试  验的核弹头设计图。资料显示,1994年中国 的核工业集团向巴基 斯坦核武器实验室移交了5000个环形磁铁用于制造能够提高铀 浓度的气体离心机。面对 国际社会的强烈反响,中国于1996年承诺不会 同没有安全保障的核设施进行进一步的合作。

China helped Pakistan buildtwo civilian nuclear reactors at the Chasma site in the Punjabprovince under agreements made before it joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) in 2004. More recently, Chinahas been planning to build two additional new nuclear reactors for Pakistan (Chasma III and Chasma IV), but the U.S. has indicated that Beijing must first seek an exemption from theNSG for any future nuclear technology transfers. When China joinedthe NSG, it subjected itself to rules that forbid the sale and export ofnuclear technology to countries that have not signed the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Beijing hasargued that the new proposed sale should be viewed as part of the earlieragreement struck with Pakistanbefore Beijingjoined the NSG and thus be “grandfathered” into international acceptance.
2004年,中国在加入核供应集团(NSG)之前根据协议帮助巴 基斯坦在旁遮普省建立了两座民用核反应堆。最近,中国计划为巴基斯坦修建另外两座核反应堆,美国提醒中 国为了将来的核技术转移务必要从核供应集团取得豁免权。中国在加入核供应集团之时,就接受了禁止把核技术销售或出口到没有签署《核不扩散条约》国家的协议。 北京则认为 新 的销售提议应该被看作是早前与巴基斯坦签署的协议,这是在北京加入核 供应集团以及被国际社会所认 可之前的事情。

An Obama Administration decision to allowthe China–Pakistan nuclear deal to advance unhindered would contradict earlierstatements by U.S. officialsthat the construction of the two new nuclear plants would be inconsistent with China’s NSGcommitments. It could also jeopardize nuclear safety and security on thesubcontinent, given that Pakistan’sincreased access to civilian nuclear technology poses a potential proliferationthreat.
奥巴马政府没有对中巴的 核 交易施加阻力,这与 之前美国官方的声明相左,声明称中国新 建的两座核电站违背了其在核供应集团 上的承诺。同时,巴基斯坦对民用核技术进一步应 用造成了潜在的扩散之虞,危及核平衡以及南亚次大陆的安全。

Though Pakistanconsiders China a morereliable defense partner than the U.S.,Islamabad should also recognize that China’s support has its limits, especiallyduring times of conflict and tension between New Delhiand Islamabad.When Pakistan sought Chinese assistance during its 1965 war with India, Beijingencouraged Islamabad to withdraw its forces from Indian territory.[8] Duringthe 1999 Indo–Pakistani border war in Kargil, Beijing privately supported U.S.calls for Pakistan to withdraw its forces from the heights of Kargil on theIndian side of the Line of Control to defuse the crisis, and apparentlycommunicated this stance to Pakistani leaders. The Chinese position during theKargil episode helped spur a thaw in Indian–Chinese relations. During the2001–2002 Indo–Pakistani military crisis, Chinastayed neutral and counseled restraint on both sides, declaring that China was a“neighbor and friend of both countries.”[9]
尽 管 巴基斯坦认为中国是 一个比美国更加靠得住的盟友,伊 斯兰 堡也应该认识到中国的支持是有限的,特别是在新德里与伊斯兰堡剑拔弩张和冲突的 时候。巴基斯坦曾在1965年与印度的战争中寻求中国的帮助,北京怂恿伊斯兰堡从印度境内撤 军。1990年印巴边境卡尔吉尔战争期间,美国要求巴基斯坦 把军队从卡尔吉尔印度控 制 区的制高点上撤军来缓解危机,北京表面上与巴基斯坦领导人相互通气,暗地里却支 持美 国的做法。中国 在卡尔 吉尔问题上的立场使得印巴关系得以缓和。在2001至2002年印巴军事危机中,中国严守中立并呼吁双方保持克制,声称中国是两个国家的邻居和朋友。

Rising Concerns about Terrorism
对恐怖主义越来 越深 的忧虑


One source of tension between Beijing and Islamabadthat has surfaced over the last few years is Chinese concern over some ChineseUighur separatists receiving sanctuary and terrorist training on Pakistaniterritory. The Chinese province of Xinjiang is home toeight million Muslim Uighurs, many of whom resent the growing presence andeconomic grip of the Han Chinese on the region. Some Uighurs have agitated foran independent “East Turkestan.” To mollifyChina’s concerns, Pakistan has begun to clamp down on Uighur settlements and onreligious schools purportedly used as training grounds for militants.[10] Mediareports indicate that Pakistan may have extradited as many as nine Uighurs toChina in April 2009 after accusing them of involvement in terroristactivities.[11] While it is unclear which percentage of Uighur separatists areaffiliated with al-Qaeda, terrorism expert Walid Phares testified before theU.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission in 2009 that jihadists makeup about 5 percent to 10 percent of the Uighur movement.[12] He has also notedthe presence of a “jihadi web” in Pakistan that includes Uighur extremists.[13]
近些年来,北京和伊斯兰堡关系紧张的其 中一个原因是中国担 心某些维吾尔分离势力在巴基斯坦境内避难并进行恐怖主义训练。中国的新疆省 是八 百万穆斯林维吾尔人的家乡,他们当中的很多 人对 汉族人在这一地区的存在以及对维吾尔人经济上的摄夺感到愤恨,从而谋求‘东突厥斯坦’的独立。为了缓解中国的疑虑,巴基斯坦 开始 对 维吾尔人的定居点以及据称被当做激进分子训练场地的宗教学校进行弹压。据媒体报道,2009年巴基斯坦曾向中国引渡了9名维族人,他们被控参与恐怖主义活动。隶属于基地组织的维吾尔分离势力的百分比尚不清楚,恐怖主义专家瓦利德·法勒斯在2009年美中经济安全审 查委员会召开之前证实,圣战分子由5%到10%的维吾尔人所组成。同时他还提到了存在于巴基斯坦境内 的‘圣战网络’活跃着维吾尔极端分子。

In July 2009, ethnic violence broke out in Urumqi, the capital ofXinjiang province, in which at least 197 people were killed and 1,700injured—mostly Han Chinese. The rioting began when roughly 1,000 Uighurprotesters were confronted by riot police. The Chinese government blamed theviolence primarily on Uighur exiles, but Pakistani radical influence was alsocited as contributing to the violence.[14]
2009年7月,新疆首 府 乌鲁木齐发 生了恐怖主义袭击,造成至少197人死亡1700多人受伤,绝大部 分是汉族人。1000多名维吾尔抗议者和防暴警察的对峙成为了此次骚乱的导火索。中国政府就此次暴乱只谴责 了维吾尔分裂势力,但(实际上)巴基斯坦激进组 织的势力 也参与其中。

More recent attacks in Xinjiang in lateJuly 2011 that killed 20 people prompted Chinese criticisms of Pakistan for failing to crack down on the trainingof Uighur separatists in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.[15] TheChinese rebuke mirrored U.S.calls for the Pakistani government to do more to rein in Afghan insurgents whoalso find sanctuary in Pakistan.Local Chinese authorities in Xinjiang charged that the person who conducted theJuly attacks in Kashgar had received training in Pakistan. The accusations wererepeated in the China Daily newspaper. Pakistani political leader MushahidHussain acknowledged in an op-ed that another attack similar to the one inKashgar over the summer would have serious implications for China–Pakistanties.[16]
最近一次对新疆的袭击发生在2011年7月,造成20人死亡,中国 严厉批评巴基斯坦未能镇压阿富汗边境部落接受训练的 维吾尔分离势力。起初是美国要求巴基斯坦对在其境内容身的阿富汗叛 乱分子采取更加严格的限制,现在轮到中国谴责了。中国的 新疆当局指责参与了7月袭击喀什的人员曾在巴基斯坦接受训练。《中国日报》英文版也进行了谴责。巴基斯坦政治领导人穆沙希德·侯赛 因公开承认今年夏天另一场针对喀什的类似袭击可能 会 对中巴关系产生重大影响。

Chinese officials are increasinglyconnecting the level of terrorist activity in Pakistanto instability in western China.One Chinese academic has noted in his writings that China has developed a moreneutral position on the Indo–Pakistani dispute over Kashmir over the pastdecade in part because China believes that the dispute could have implicationsfor ethnic-religious unrest in China, especially in Tibet or Xinjiang.[17] Inthis context, the ascendance of Taliban forces in either Pakistan orAfghanistan is clearly not in China’s interest. But rather than encouraging Islamabad to adopt acomprehensive approach toward countering terrorism, Chinese leaders have usedtheir relationships with Pakistani military officials, and with the Islamistpolitical parties, to persuade them to discourage attacks on Chinese interests.Before 9/11, for example, the Chinese reached agreements with the Taliban toprevent Uighur separatists from using Afghanistan as a training groundfor militant activities.[18]
巴基斯坦境内的恐怖主义活动使中 国对其西 部的稳定感到忧心忡忡。一位中国学者在他的著作里提到,过去十年间,中 国就克什米尔问题在印巴之间采 取了更加中立的态度, 这 是因为中国认为印巴之争可能会殃及池鱼,把中国卷入民族和宗教的动荡之中,尤其是在西藏或者新疆。就这一点而言,不管是阿富汗还是巴基斯坦境内的塔利班武装都无关中国的利益。中国领 导人与其催促伊斯兰堡采取 综合方案来反 恐,还不如动用他们与巴基 斯坦军方以及伊斯兰政治领导人的关系。比如在911之前,中国就阻止阿 富汗成为维吾尔分离势力军事行动的训练场地 问题同塔利班达成一致。

Chinese vice premier in charge of publicsecurity, Meng Jianchu, visited Pakistan in late September 2011, in whatoutside observers described as a mission aimed at strengthening cooperationwith Islamabad in dealing with the challenge of militancy in Xinjiang.[19] But,according to American China expert Michael Swaine, Beijing is balancing itsinterest in suppressing the Uighur threat with the possibility that suchsuppression might further fuel Uighur separatism and provoke further attacksagainst Chinese interests.[20] One of the main reasons that China has refrainedfrom providing material support to the NATO mission in Afghanistan is to avoidbeing portrayed as part of an alliance against Islam.[21] The Chinese believethat the United States’ low favorability ratings in Muslim countries is proofthat U.S. interference in the internal affairs of these countries comes withserious blowback.[22]
2011年9月,中国主管公共安全的副总理孟建柱访问巴基斯坦,外界观察员认为此次出访旨在就新疆动乱问题加强与伊斯兰堡 的合作。不过按照美 籍华人专家迈克尔·斯韦因的观点,北京对维吾尔人的镇压可能会使维吾尔分离主义愈演愈烈并进一步损害中 国的利益,所以北京正在谋求利 益平衡。另一个重要原因就是 中国拒绝对在阿富汗搞事的北约提供实质的支持,使中国没有成为反伊斯兰联盟 的成员。中国认为美国在穆斯林国家难孚众望证明了美国干涉这些国家的国际事务带来了难以消 弭的后遗症。

Tension has also surfaced between Islamabad and Beijing inrecent years over attacks by Islamist extremists on Chinese workers, whichnumber about 10,000 in Pakistan.This tension came to a head in summer 2007 when Islamist militants kidnappedseveral Chinese citizens whom they accused of running a brothel in Islamabad. China wasincensed by this incident, and its complaints to Pakistani authorities likelycontributed to Pakistan’s decision to finally launch a military operation atthe Red Mosque in Islamabad, where the militants had holed up for seven months.Around the same time, three Chinese officials were killed in Peshawar. Several days later, a suicidebomber attacked a group of Chinese engineers in Baluchistan.Senior Chinese leaders, such as President Hu Jintao, have called on Pakistanileaders to increase protection of Chinese workers in the country and threatenedto pull funding from projects where Chinese workers have come under threat.[23]
近年来伊斯兰堡和北京的紧张也表现在 伊斯兰极端分子对中国工人的袭击,巴基斯坦有1万名中国工人。2007年,两国关系达到了白热化。伊斯兰激进分子绑架了数名中国公民,他们被指控在伊斯兰堡开设妓院。中国对这次事件感到愤怒,巴 基斯坦当局迫于 压力,对伊斯兰堡市内的红色清真寺发动了军 事行动,激进分子在此藏匿了七个月之久。与此同时,三名中国官员在白沙瓦遇害。几天之后,一名自杀式人弹在俾路支省袭击了一群中国工程师。中国 的高级领导人,比如胡总主席在访问巴基斯坦时要求 增加对中国工人的保护,并威胁将暂停受害的中国工人所在地项目所需的资金。

Another sign that China was feelingincreasingly compelled to pressure Pakistan to adopt stricter counterterrorismpolicies was when, in December 2008, Beijing dropped its resistance to banningthe Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD—a front organization for the Pakistan-basedLashkar-e-Tayyiba, responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai terror attacks) inthe United Nations Security Council. Before then, China had vetoed Security Councilresolutions seeking to ban the JuD.
中国强迫巴基斯坦采取更加严厉的反恐政策也是迫不得已的,2008年11月, 中国不 再反对联合国安理会制裁达瓦慈善会(巴基斯坦虔诚军 的前身,2008年11月发动了对孟买的恐怖袭击)。在此之前,中国否决了联合 国安理会对达瓦慈善会的制裁。

The Economic Relationship: SurprisinglyLimited
经济关系:限制重重


Pakistan’s portrayal of its relationship with China features exaggeration of theeconomic dimension of the relationship. Pakistani media routinely report hugenumbers for investment and financing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC),numbers that cannot be verified by any independent source, including by theChinese government or the Chinese companies supposedly involved. WhilePakistani officials talk of a total of $25 billion in Chinese investment in Pakistanso far, the PRC’s official figure of direct investment through 2010 is $1.83billion.[24]
巴 基斯坦在描述与中国的关系时 夸大了经济层面上的联系。巴基 斯 坦媒体数十年如一日地报道着 来自中国政府或企业的巨额投资和融资,这些账目没有独立的来源可供查实。巴基斯坦官员称迄今为止中国在巴基斯坦累计 投资 了250亿美元,而中国官方统计2011年的直接投资是18.3亿美元。

The Heritage Foundation’s China GlobalTracker documents investments as well as engineering and construction contractsof $100 million or more since the beginning of 2005, as reported by thecompanies. The China Tracker shows only $1.2 billion in such investment andcontracts combined through 2010.[25] These are dominated by telecommunications,with China Mobile acquiring Paktel and investing in improvements in Pakistan’stelecommunications system, such as paying the Chinese engineering company GreatWall to launch a satellite.
美国传统基金会(本文的研究机构)的《中国全球追踪》也证实了自2005年以来,中国在巴 基斯坦的投资以及工程建筑合同达到了1亿 美元或者 更多。据《中国追踪》的记载,2010年 的投资和合同加起 来只有12亿美元。巴基斯坦的电信业 成了中国的禁脔,中国移动公司不仅 收购了巴科泰尔(巴第5大移动运营商),还对巴基 斯坦的通讯系统进行投资,比如让中国的长城工业公司发射卫星。

The Heritage Foundation figure precludestransactions initiated before 2005 and is therefore too low for a country like Pakistan,where Chinese involvement is long-standing. But it also does not include roadand port projects that have not begun and are unlikely to look anything likethe gigantic endeavors advertised by Pakistan. While Pakistan touts the expansion ofGwadar and other ports as multibillion dollar projects, the leading enterpriseChina Communications Construction notes only a modest project to expandfacilities in Karachi.[26]
2005年之前,传统 基金会的统计排除处理还没有启用,所以对于像巴基斯坦这样中国长期投资的国家来说太低。不过道路和港口项 目并不 包括在内,也没有破土动工,看起来更像是巴基斯坦 用来宣传的广告而已。巴基斯坦把瓜达尔港和其他港口吹嘘成几十亿美元的大项目,而中 国交 通建设集团宣布只是在卡拉奇有一个中等规模的扩建工程。

In sum, Chinese investment activity in Pakistan isquite modest. It is a negligible fraction of total Chinese outward investmentof more than $250 billion since 2005 and dwarfed by Chinese activity in Indonesia,for example.[27] This should not be a surprise. Chinese outward investment ismotivated more by domestic economic needs than by foreign policy goals. Whatthe PRC deems to be strategic sectors—iron, copper, oil, coal, and gas—arematerials needed to keep domestic industry humming and hundreds of millions ofpeople employed. Farmland is similar, though it has proven more difficult toacquire. Pakistanhas comparatively little in the way of any of these resources.
总之,中国对巴 基斯坦 的直接投资少 得可怜。自2005年以来,中国对外投资超过2500亿美元, 巴基斯坦所占比例微乎其微, 比如中国对印尼的投资都 更胜一筹。这一点也不奇怪。中国对外投资是受国内经济需求而不是外交政 策的 引导。诸如铁、铜、石油和天然气等被中国视为战略利益的资源 可以保证国 内工业不断运转以及数亿人的就业。耕地也是一样,尽管已经被证明难 以获取。而这些资源都是巴基斯坦所不具有的。
(图1)

Chinese private investors, which are farsmaller than their state-controlled counterparts, seek either an asset thatwill considerably strengthen their position in the home market, or a new marketthey can sell to because they are hampered at home. Textiles might beattractive now that Chinese costs are rising, but most of the textileinvestment moving out of the PRC to this point is foreign-funded. Pakistanagain has fairly little to offer commercially and the political connection hasproven inadequate to spur exchange.
中国的私人投资 者远少于国有 企业,他 们所寻求的资产极大地加强了其在国内市场的地位,抑或是由于在国内受到了阻滞而开拓新的市场。目前由于中国的成本上升, 纺织业受到了青睐,不过绝大部分从中国转移出去的纺织业投资是由外资控股的。巴基斯坦由于 其 在经 济上的乏善可陈和政 治关 联又一次被证明不足以刺激双方的贸易。

While Chinais not spending much money itself in Pakistan, it might be financingPakistani spending. Here the evidence is not clear because the principalvehicle for Chinese financing, the China Development Bank (CDB), does notprovide information of the same quality or quantity as many Chinese enterprisesinvesting overseas. The CDB’s foreign loan portfolio has been stated as morethan $140 billion, but the many claims made around the world about its loansadd up to far more than that.[28] One important reason for the gap is thatcountries boast about lines of credit, not actual loans made.
然而中国并没有在巴基斯坦 进行巨额投资,也可能是注资来为巴基斯坦 买单。中国在巴 基斯坦方面投资甚少也 可能是因为这一方面的佐 证尚不充 分,因为中国的融资巨 头——国家开发银行(CDB)不像其他在海外投资的中国企业一样提供足够多的信息,无论是 质量或是数量。国家开发银行公布的国外放款业务已经 超过了1400亿美元,但 其在全世界范围内的债权加起来远不止这些。这其中的差额主要是由各国吹 嘘的信用 额 度造成的,而不 是真实的借贷。

In this somewhat unclear environment, itdoes not appear that realized Chinese lending to Pakistan is large or even moderate.Scattered claims of large loans are again unverified by independent sources andtied to projects or shipments that have not yet been made. The PRC typicallylends large amounts in barter—such as loans for oil—or to fund sizableengineering projects, and neither is frequent among Chinese–Pakistani economictransactions.[29]
在这种多少有点不公开的情形下,大笔贷款的零散债券以 及与之关联 的工程或者 出货都没有经过独立机构的核对。中国大笔贷款的典型方式就是兑换实物,比如石油贷款或者 投资大型工程项目,两者在中巴经 济交易中并不常见。

Indirect evidence comes from thePakistan–China Investment Company (PCIC). The PCIC is an alliance between theChina Development Bank and the Pakistani government.[30] Elsewhere, the ChinaDevelopment Bank uses such entities extensively. The China–Africa DevelopmentFund, for instance, was set up about the same time as PCIC but is 25 timeslarger in terms of capital, and far more active.[31] According to the publicrecord, PCIC does not seem to be doing much of anything.
 间接证 据 则来自中巴联合投资 公司(PCIC)。中巴投资公司是中国国家开发银行和巴基斯坦政府的 联姻。除此之外,中国 国家开发银 行还在其他地 区有着类似的机构。举个例子,几乎同时建立的中非发展基金的资金规模是中巴投资公司的25倍,而且更为活跃。根据官方记载,中巴投资公司似乎并无 多大建树。

Chinese humanitarian aid to Pakistan also has been modest, especially whencompared to that provided by the U.S. After massive flooding in Pakistan in the summer of 2010, for instance,the U.S.provided nearly $700 million in flood relief and in-kind assistance. Chinaeventually committed to providing $250 million, after a meager initialcontribution of $18 million.[32]
中国对巴基斯坦的人道主义 援助规模有限,特别是 与美国相比。比如说2010 年巴基斯坦的洪灾,美国提供了将近7亿美元 的救济和实物援助。中国最初打算提供区区1800万美元,最后决定改为2.5亿美元。

While U.S.humanitarian aid outstripped that from China,Beijing hasprovided much-needed reconstruction aid for the worst-hit flood areas. U.S.media reports claimed in September 2010 that 7,000 to 10,000 People’sLiberation Army (PLA) troops were deployed to Gilgit–Baltistan in northernPakistan to help rebuild areas devastated by the 2010 floods.[33] Indiananalysts also noted the presence of PLA logistics and engineering corps in theregion to provide flood relief and to build infrastructure projects, such asroads, railways, and dams. In early October, Indian army chief General V. K.Singh noted that about 3,000 to 4,000 Chinese troops were stationed in northernPakistan focusing on construction projects.[34]
美国的人道主义援助超 过了中国,不过北京向受灾最严重地区提供了急需的重建援助。据2010年9月美国媒体的报道,7000到10000名解放军调 往了巴基斯坦北部 吉尔吉特-伯尔蒂斯坦地区帮助重建被2010 年洪水摧毁的地 区。印度的分析人员也注意到了解放军的后勤和工程兵部队在这一地区提供救灾物资并建设注入道路、铁路和水坝等 基础设施。十月上旬,印度陆军参谋长V.K.辛格称大约有3000到4000中 国军队驻扎在巴基 斯坦北部进行施工。

The final, and perhaps most important,indication of the limits of the China–Pakistan financial relationship is thePRC’s not-so-gentle shunting of Pakistani aid requests to the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF). The IMF denied large-scale aid requests made by Pakistanimmediately after the September 2008 financial shock, forcing Islamabad toaccept a multi-billion-dollar IMF program with stringent economicconditions.[35] In the end, China did agree to provide around $500 million inconcessionary lending to Pakistan, but its refusal to provide large-scale loansindicates clear limits on China’s willingness to take primary responsibilityfor Pakistan’s financial woes.
最后也可能是最重要 的,中巴财政关系的限制体现在巴基斯坦向国际货币基金组织(IMF)请求援助,而中国对此采取了并不温和的回避之举。国际货币基金组织在2008年9月的金融危机之后立即否决了巴基斯坦大规模援助的请求,迫使伊斯兰堡在其 经济不景气的时候接受一项数十 亿美元的IMF项目。最后,中国才 同意向巴基斯坦提供了约5亿 美元的特许 贷款,不过这一大笔贷款的优先取舍权表明了中国并不是那么乐意替巴基斯坦的财政困难来 买单。

Gwadar Port Project:More Symbolism than Substance?
瓜达尔港工程: 象征意义大于实质效果?


Chinese lending for the Gwadar Portproject in Pakistan’s Baluchistanprovince on the Arabian Sea has received agreat deal of media attention. China has reportedly financed around 80 percentof the $250 million estimated cost for completion of the first phase of theproject, and has agreed to fund most of the second phase, which could costnearly $500 million and feature the construction of several additional berthsand terminals.
巴基斯 坦俾路支省的瓜达尔港濒临阿拉伯海,中 国在此投资的 项 目受到了媒体的瞩目。据报道,中国已经向完成工 程第一阶段所需的2.5亿美元注资了80%左右,第二阶段主要建设数个附加的泊 位和码头,预计花费大约5亿美元,中国同意承担大部 分投资。

China’s financing of the port has drawnattention since access to the port would allow China to secure oil and gassupplies from the Persian Gulf and potentially project power in the IndianOcean.[36] The port complex is expected to provide industrial facilities formore than 20 countries and eventually have the capability to receive oiltankers with a capacity of 200,000 tons. Pakistan signed an agreement withthe Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) in 2007 to run the port for the next 25years. However, progress on construction of associated road, rail, and pipelineinfrastructure needed to create the core export-processing zone has lagged dueto security risks and continued attacks on sites and workers.[37]
中国对瓜 达尔港的投资引起关注是在获得了港口的使用权之后,中国不仅 可以安全无虞地从波 斯湾获得石油和天然气,而且有 可能向 印度洋投送军力。整个港口有望为20多个国家提供 工业设施,并最终成为可 以停泊20万吨油轮的港口。2007年 新加 坡港务局同巴基斯坦签署协议,在接下来的25内管理瓜达尔港。可是由于危险分子对场所和工人进行袭击,核心加工出口区的建设已经迟滞于配套的公路、 铁 路和管道等基础设施。

India, the U.S., andother countries are concerned that China may eventually seek access tothe port for its warships. Indeed, Pakistan’sdefense minister recently claimed that Pakistanhad invited Chinato start building a naval base at Gwadar; Chinese officials publicly dismissedthe notion. It is unclear whether Islamabad madethe statement without coordinating with Beijingor whether the episode was carefully choreographed to send a signal to theinternational community (i,e., the U.S.and India)about the potential global impact of a cozier Sino–Pakistani alliance.
印度、美国和其他国 家担心中国可能最终为它的军舰谋求港口的使用权。最近,巴基斯坦的国防部长声称巴基斯坦已经邀请中国在瓜达尔港 建设海军基地,中国政府公开否认了这 一消息。到底是伊斯兰堡 的声明没有得到北京的配合,还是这个精心设计的桥段向国际社会(比如美国和印度)传达 了一个更为密切的中巴同盟潜在的 全球影响力,那就 不得而知了。

Trade also Lagging
 同样落后的贸易


Trade is not exaggerated by Pakistanor rendered unclear by Chinese secrecy. As with investment and (apparently)finance, though, it is relatively insubstantial. On Chinese figures, bilateraltrade volume was below $9 billion in 2010 and grew slightly less quickly thanthe PRC’s overall trade. The Philippinesare similar to Pakistan inGDP and not as close politically with China. The Philippinesmining sector is underdeveloped. Yet China’sbilateral trade with the Philippinesin 2010 was still three times larger than its trade with Pakistan, and grew faster.
巴基斯坦没 有夸大贸易,中国也没有含糊其辞。正如投资和财政一 样,贸易同样经不起推敲。中国的报表显示,2009年的双边贸 易量少于90亿美元,与中国的总贸易量相比略有增长但增速较慢。菲律宾与巴基斯坦的GDP大致相等,但在政治上与中国并不紧密。菲 律宾的采矿业并不发 达。然而2010年中国同菲律宾的双边 贸易量是巴基斯坦 的三倍,增速也是如此。

(图2)

Not only is the trade relationship small,it is imbalanced. The PRC’s 2010 surplus was $5.2 billion, tiny by Chinesestandards, but huge in comparison to bilateral trade volume. If Beijing wanted to assist Islamabadfor political reasons, it could artificially inflate imports from Pakistan, atleast on a temporary basis. Cosmetic efforts along these lines are routinelymade with the PRC’s major economic partners,[38] but Pakistan clearly does not qualify.
贸易规模不仅小,而且不均衡。2010年中国的顺差是52亿美元,按照中国 人的标准数额很小,但对 于双边贸易来说就非常大了。如果北京为了政治原因而 帮助伊斯兰堡,就应该人 为地从巴基斯坦进口,至少暂 时这 么做。按照这一方针,表面上虽然成为了中国的主要经 济伙伴, 但巴 基 斯坦很明显还不够格。

(图3)


In contrast to lagging trade with Pakistan, China’strade relationship with Indiais increasing at a relatively fast pace. Sino–Indian trade has increased fromaround $5 billion in 2002 to more than $60 billion in 2010, and the two sideshave pledged to boost trade over the next five years to $100 billion annually.While Sino–Indian border tensions persist, their rapidly expanding traderelationship is a positive indicator and could encourage mutual interest inregional stability, and greater attention on the part of Beijingto balancing ties between Pakistanand India.
中国同印度的贸易迅速增长,与巴基斯坦形成鲜明对比。中印贸易从2002年的50亿美元增加到了2010年的600亿美元,同时双方承诺在接下来 的5年内把贸易增加 到每年1000亿美元。如今中印边界仍然很紧张,而迅速增长的贸易不失为一个 积极的风向标,有助于 双方保持这一 地区的稳 定,并让北京把更多的注意力 放在平衡自身与印巴的关系上。

U.S.Policy—Dos and Don’ts
美国的政策——何去何从


Pakistan’s effort to spotlight its growing ties to China is partly an attempt to build confidencedomestically in the wake of the Osama bin Laden raid, which embarrassed thePakistani military and fueled doubts about the U.S. as a reliable partner. Islamabad is also signaling Washingtonthat it has other foreign policy options to pursue if the U.S. pushes thePakistani government too far on counterterrorism issues. Some in the U.S. accept this line of thinking and worryabout pushing Pakistanfurther into China’sembrace, viewing China as atool of leverage that Pakistanholds over the U.S.
奥萨玛·本·拉登遇袭之后, 巴基斯坦军方感到局促不  安,开始怀疑 美国这个盟友的可靠性,于是巴基斯坦通过向外界 展示其与中国不断加深的联系来树立国内的信心。伊斯兰堡同时也向华盛顿发出信号,如果美国 在反恐问题上对巴基斯坦打压太甚,他们 还有其他的外交政策可供选择。一些美国人接受了这一思想,担 心把 巴基斯坦推向了中国的怀抱,并视中国为巴基斯坦用来制衡美国的一张王牌。

But U.S.policymakers must recognize that there are limits to what Pakistan can expect from its relationship with China.Pakistan has traditionallysought close ties with both Chinaand the U.S. and it wouldhave to seriously consider the costs of putting all its eggs in the China basket. China’s lack of interest in bailing Pakistan out economically and the substantialinfluence the U.S. wieldswithin international lending organizations, such as the IMF and World Bank, arefactors that Islamabadwould have to take into account. Moreover, Chinais increasingly concerned about the spillover of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan, and there may be room for Washington to seek cooperation with Beijingin encouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan.
不过美国的决策者必须意识到巴基斯坦从中国获 得的 利益是 有限的。一直以来,巴基斯坦与中美双方保持着密切的关系,他们 必须认真考虑 把所有的鸡蛋都放在 中国的篮子里的代价。 中国没有兴趣帮助巴基斯坦摆脱经济困境,而美国动用诸如IMF和世界银行等国际借贷机构的实 质影响则是伊斯兰堡不得不深思熟虑的。此外,中国 越来越 担心巴基斯坦极端主 义和恐怖主义的渗透,美国 应该在支持 一个更加稳定和繁荣的巴基斯坦 方面寻求与北京的合作。

To achieve its policy objectives withregard to Pakistan, the U.S.should:

Pursue U.S.counterterrorism policies directed at Pakistan without worrying about thepolicies’ impact on Pakistani–Chinese relations. Some in the U.S. argue for softer counterterrorism policiestoward Pakistan because theyfear a tough approach would push Islamabadfurther into Beijing’sembrace. This is a straw-man argument, however, as Chinadoes not want full responsibility for Pakistanand its economic challenges and prefers that Washingtonremain engaged with Islamabad.U.S. policymakers shouldrecognize that Pakistan usesthe China card to scare U.S. officials into thinking they have no choiceother than to appease Pakistanwhen it comes to terrorism and provision of military aid.
为了实现关于巴基斯坦的政治目标,美国应该:

继续在巴基斯坦执行美国的反 恐政策,无需担心该政策对巴中关系的 影响。一 些美国人支持对巴基斯塔采 取更加柔和的反恐政策,因为他们害怕逼 得 太急, 伊斯兰堡会倒向北 京的怀抱。然而这种论点 偷换了概 念,因为中国不想为巴基斯坦窘迫的经济买单,更希 望华 盛顿继续同伊 斯兰堡接洽。美国的决策者别 无选择,除非就恐怖主义和 军事援助的条款 满足巴基斯坦的胃口。

Enhance dialogue with China on Pakistan’s future prospects forstability, including ways to dampen extremist trends in Pakistani society andto reduce terrorist recruitment. There are indications that China is worriedabout the prospect of further destabilization in Pakistan and has engaged incontingency planning for different possible scenarios in Pakistan, includingspreading Islamist militancy and nuclear weapons falling into the wronghands.[39] The U.S. should convince China to adopt a more holistic approach toterrorism issues in Pakistan, explaining that Pakistan’s support for someterrorist groups strengthens the ideological base, logistical capabilities, andfinancial support for all Islamist terrorist groups. As part of this effort, Washington should share any available intelligence with Beijing on the possiblepresence of Chinese citizens at Pakistan-based terrorist training camps.
就巴基斯坦未来稳定的前景 加强与中国的对话,包括遏制巴基斯坦社会上 的极端主义趋势,减少恐怖分子的招募。种种迹象表明,中国对巴基斯坦局势的进一步恶化感到担忧,准备了应急预案来应对可能发生 在巴基斯坦的不同状况,包括伊斯兰 恐怖活动以及核武器落入坏 人之手。美国应该说服中国在巴基斯坦的 恐怖主义问题上高瞻远 瞩,因为伊斯兰堡支持的一些恐怖组织为所有伊斯兰恐怖组织加强了意识形态基础、后勤能力以及财政支持。作为这项工作的一部分, 华盛 顿应该就巴基斯 坦恐怖主义训练营中 的中国人的情 报同北京共享。

Initiate discussions with Beijingabout U.S. and Chineseinvestment and trade with Pakistanthat would contribute to its stability. Fears of China“owning” Pakistanare unfounded, as the economic relationship is simply not that substantial.Indeed, the U.S.should welcome greater Chinese–Pakistani economic interaction, particularlyadditional Chinese investment, construction, lending, and trade, sincebolstering the Pakistani economy will help create conditions for greaterstability and prosperity in the country. While joint Sino–American assistanceprojects are impractical because the two countries operate so differentlycommercially, the comparative advantage of U.S. direct investment in areassuch as agriculture, finance, and education could complement the Chineseinvestments in telecommunications and port construction. Shared informationcould improve the quality of both sides’ work.
就中美两国与巴基斯坦有助于稳定的投资贸易方面的问题与北京展开 对话。中国‘拥有’巴基斯坦的担忧是不成立的,因为经济关联没有触及根本。美国应该欢迎中巴经济 交流的增长, 特别是增加中 国 的 投资、建设、贷款和贸易,因为支持巴基斯坦经济有 助于巴基斯坦的稳定和前景。然而中美联合起 来搞援助工程是不 现实的,因为 两个国家的商业运作大相径 庭,美国比较占 优势 的直接投资领域是农业、金融和教育,而中国的投资则在通讯和港口建设。 共享信息有助于提高双方工作的效率。

Include Chinain some multilateral approaches to Pakistan’seconomic challenges and coordinate with China on bilateral assistance. China should be invited to participate fully asthe IMF continues to work with Pakistan’sprivate creditors, for instance. At the moment, due to the unusual nature ofits financial assistance, Chinalargely deals separately with Pakistan,an arrangement that does not benefit private creditors or American interestsand does not seem to have appealed much to China, either. A more unifiedapproach would increase outside leverage and coherence in pushing Pakistanto make needed reform.
解决巴基斯坦的经济困 局,需要包括中国在内的多 国参与, 在双边援助上 也要与中国合 作。举个例子,随着IMF与巴基斯坦私人债权人进行合作,中国也应该充分地参与进来。与此同时,由于经济援 助不同寻常,中国与巴基斯坦的大部分交易都是独立的,私 人债权人或美 国并未从中受益,中国似乎对 此并不感冒。


Discourage China’ssale of new nuclear reactors to Pakistan,citing concerns over proliferation. The U.S.must hold firm to its opposition to the sale of new nuclear reactors to Pakistanoutside the international nonproliferation regime. Pakistan is expanding and improvingits nuclear arsenal more rapidly than any country in the world, and isestimated to have produced sufficient fissile material to manufacture anadditional 100 nuclear weapons to supplement the approximately 100 weaponsalready in its possession. At its current rate of production, Islamabad is poised to become one of the topfour largest nuclear powers in the world. Given concerns over extremistsgaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear technology and past incidents of nuclearproliferation from Pakistan, namely the A. Q. Khan nuclear black market thatfacilitated the Libyan, Iranian, and North Korean nuclear weapons programs,China should demonstrate that it is a responsible international actor when itcomes to Pakistan and nuclear issues. Moving forward with the sale of two newnuclear reactors outside the international regime to a country at high risk forfurther proliferation would call China’s own nonproliferationcredentials into question. Indeed China’sconcerns over prospects for stability in Pakistanshould prompt China to takegreater interest in measures to enhance the security of Pakistan’snuclear weapons arsenal.
因为害怕造成扩散而阻止中国向巴基斯坦销售新的核反应堆。美国必须坚决反对在国际防扩散框架之外(中国)把新 的核反 应堆卖给巴基斯 坦。巴基斯  坦 扩张和研发核武库的速度超过了世界上任何一个国家,据 估计巴基斯坦 生产的核燃 料足够 制造100枚核武器来补充现有的100枚核武器。按照目前的生产速度,伊斯兰堡随时准备着跃居成 为全球四大核武器大国 之一。出 于对巴基斯坦的核技 术落到极端分子手 中的担忧,以及过去巴基斯坦的核扩散,也就是阿巴杜·卡迪尔·汗的地下核市场促进了利比亚、伊朗和 朝鲜的核武器项目,中国应该在巴基斯坦和核问题上证明自 己是一个负责任的大国。中国在国际 体系之外 销售两座新的核反应堆可能 会进一步提高核扩散的风险,并使中国自身的防扩散信用受到质疑。中国对巴 基斯 坦稳定的前景感到担忧,促使中国采取进一步的措施 来加强 巴基斯坦核武库的安全。

Conclusion
结论


China’s concerns about the future development of Pakistan will likely limit the extent to whichit will help Pakistanout of its economic difficulties. While Chinahas an interest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan, the notion that Chinese ties couldserve as a replacement for U.S.ties is far-fetched. Instead of wringing its hands over Chinese influence with Pakistan, the U.S.should seek Beijing’s cooperation in encouraginga more stable and prosperous Pakistan.
中国对巴基斯塔未来前景的担 忧可能会影响到帮助巴基斯坦摆脱经济困局的力度。中国感兴 趣的是与巴基斯 坦保持强有力的安 全关系,用中国来取代美国的想法是不 切实际的。美 国应该在支持一个更加稳定和繁荣的巴基斯坦方面寻求与北京的合作,而不是排挤中 国对巴 基斯坦的影响。
原创翻译:龙腾网 http://www.ltaaa.com 翻译:病中乃知 转载请注明出处
 
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